




How Torres Strait Islanders shaped 
Australia’s border
Tim Rowse
As an Opposition member of parliament in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Gough Whitlam took a keen interest in Australia’s responsibilities, under 
the United Nations’ mandate, to develop the Territory of Papua New 
Guinea until it became a self-determining nation. In a chapter titled 
‘International Affairs’, Whitlam proudly recalled his government’s steps 
towards Papua New Guinea’s independence (declared and recognised on 
16 September 1975).2 However, Australia’s relationship with Papua New 
Guinea in the 1970s could also have been discussed by Whitlam under 
the heading ‘Indigenous Affairs’ because from 1973 Torres Strait Islanders 
demanded (and were accorded) a voice in designing the border between 
Australia and Papua New Guinea. Whitlam’s framing of the border issue 
as ‘international’, to the neglect of its domestic Indigenous dimension, 
is an instance of history being written in what Tracey Banivanua-
Mar has called an ‘imperial’ mode. Historians, she argues, should ask 
to what extent decolonisation was merely an ‘imperial’ project: did 
‘decolonisation’ not also enable the mobilisation of Indigenous ‘peoples’ 
to become self-determining in their relationships with other Indigenous 
1  H. C. Coombs to Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (Gordon Bryant), 11 April 1973, cited in 
Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 355.
2  Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 4, 10, 26, 72, 115, 154, 738.
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peoples?3 This is what the Torres Strait Islanders did when they asserted 
their political interests during the negotiation of the Australia–Papua 
New Guinea border, though you will not learn this from Whitlam’s 
‘imperial’ account.
In this chapter, after describing the border that resulted from Australia’s 
negotiations with Papua New Guinea from 1973 to 1978 under the 
Whitlam and Fraser governments, I will describe how the Torres Strait 
Islanders’ interests shaped the Australia–Papua New Guinea border. I will 
conclude by discussing how this passage of events illustrates the possibility 
of a history of the decolonising of peoples and not merely of territories.
Map 11.1: The Australia–Papua New Guinea boundary.
Source: Annex 7 to the treaty between Australia and the independent state of Papua New 
Guinea concerning sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the area between the two 
countries, including the area known as Torres Strait, and related matters . Prepared by the 
Division of National Mapping, Canberra, and the National Mapping Bureau, Port Moresby .
3  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 8–9.
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The Australia–Papua New Guinea border
The Torres Strait Treaty4 was signed on 18 December 1978 and became 
effective in 1985, expressing the agreement by Australia and Papua New 
Guinea that the border between them should have the following features: 
• Distinct seabed and fisheries jurisdictions. While a fisheries jurisdiction 
line and a seabed jurisdiction line are in exactly the same position 
over much of their lengths – that is, running approximately halfway 
between the Australian and the Papua New Guinea mainlands – they 
diverge, so that the fisheries line includes the islands Saibai, Dauan 
and Boigu within Australian fisheries jurisdiction. In this area between 
the divergent seabed and fishery lines (known as the ‘top hat’ or ‘box’) 
Papua New Guinea has jurisdiction in matters relating to the seabed 
(such as sedentary fisheries, minerals and petroleum), while Australia 
has fisheries jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the inhabitants of 
Saibai, Dauan and Boigu and over uninhabited islands and reefs that 
are sometimes visited by both Papuans and Torres Strait Islanders.
• A ‘protected zone’. This area overlaps both seabed and fisheries 
jurisdiction lines, covering most of Torres Strait, excluding Thursday 
Island (the administrative centre of the Torres Strait region). According 
to Article 10 of the Treaty, what the ‘protected zone’ protects are 
‘the marine environment and indigenous fauna and flora’ and ‘the 
traditional way of life and livelihood of the traditional inhabitants’ 
living in the Torres Strait and in 13 villages on the Papuan coast. 
‘Protection’ has included an embargo on oil drilling. 
• Provision for the ‘traditional inhabitants’ of the Strait. The ‘traditional 
inhabitants’ are understood to include certain citizens of both Australia 
and Papua New Guinea, so that each set of persons may move about 
within the protected zone as if there were no national boundaries 
running through it. That is, the protected zone has the effect of 
suspending, in ways significant to these people, the operation of the 
border between the two nation-states, so that relationships between 
Papuans and Torres Strait Islanders are governed by evolving custom. 
4  ‘Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning 
sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the area between the two countries, including the area known 
as Torres Strait, and related matters, 18 December 1978’ (15 February 1985): Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Australian Treaty Series 1985 No. 4.
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• A governing body. A Joint Advisory Council, with members from 
both Australia and Papua New Guinea, contributes to both nations’ 
practices of implementation of the treaty. 
This was not what the Australian Government initially intended. Whitlam 
came to power in December 1972 believing that Australia’s border with 
the soon to be independent Papua New Guinea was too far north, and 
that shifting the border to a point halfway (latitude 10˚ south) between 
the two nations (giving more of the Torres Strait to Papua New Guinea) 
would respect the new nation’s legitimate interests. However, Whitlam’s 
advisers told him that the Torres Strait Islanders passionately opposed 
any change in a boundary that – since colonisation – had placed all 
Torres Strait Islanders within the same jurisdiction – first Queensland’s 
(1879–1900) and then Australia’s (from 1901). The Torres Strait Islanders 
persuaded both the Whitlam and Fraser governments to honour their 
territorial unity as a sea-going people. 
Notwithstanding that the Torres Strait Islanders, throughout negotiations 
from 1973 to 1978, opposed any boundary that bisected the Strait 
– begrudging even the median line that now apportions only ‘seabed’ 
sovereignty – the treaty makes major concessions to Torres Strait Islanders 
that I will underline. First, all inhabitants and all fisheries of the islands 
of the Torres Strait remain within Australia’s jurisdiction and thus within 
Australia’s duty of care, as Islanders continue to expect it. Second, marine 
resources that continue to form a significant part of their livelihood are 
under protection against threatening ‘development’. Third, the treaty 
makes space for customary jurisdiction: Papuans and Torres Strait 
Islanders behave towards each other according to their evolving protocols, 
as they use the seas and lands of the Torres Strait. 
How the wishes of Torres Strait Islanders 
came to matter
In 1901, when the Australian colonies confederated to form the 
Commonwealth, the new nation’s border in the Torres Strait was where 
the colony of Queensland had drawn it in 1879, thus including within 
Queensland (and consequently Australia) all residents of 17 inhabited 
islands (out of 100 islands in total) in the Torres Strait. Three of 
these islands are very close to the Papuan coast: Saibai, Dauan and Boigu. 
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Under  the federal compact, Queensland controlled the Strait’s seaways 
and  sea bottom. Some of this power shifted to the Commonwealth 
when the Whitlam Government passed the Sea and Submerged Lands 
Act 1973, but Queensland retained authority over the fishing rights of 
the entire Strait. Queensland also administered the lives of those living 
on Torres  Strait’s 13  reserves. The 1967 referendum had given the 
Commonwealth concurrent power over these people, but by the time the 
Whitlam Government was elected in December 1972, the Commonwealth 
had declined to use this new power, respecting Queensland’s continuing 
legal and administrative supremacy over Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples.
The imminence of Papua New Guinea’s independence forced the 
Commonwealth to rethink its relationship to the Torres Strait. Australians 
who wished to deal equitably with Papua New Guinea saw the boundary 
as unjustifiably favouring Australia. Whitlam had hypothesised in May 
1972 that, if the future nation of Papua New Guinea were to litigate 
the International Court of Justice, Australia would not be able to defend 
a  border that enlarged Australia at the expense of the new nation. 
Whitlam would have been aware of a motion passed by Papua New 
Guinea’s House of Assembly in May 1972, moved by Ebia Olewale and 
Naipura Maina, that the border be moved south to latitude 10˚ south. 
Olewale continued in the next few years to press this view, asserting that 
‘the people are Papuans, and my elders can trace the history of how these 
people migrated down to those islands’. While Olewale conceded that 
‘they might be rightful owners’, he thought it relevant that: 
They have relatives on the Papuan coast, who also claim that they 
own those islands. There are relatives living on those islands and 
there are relatives living on the Papuan coast … these same people 
have got to be brought together, and the only solution is to move 
this border south.5
The Queensland Government understood itself to be in a strong position 
to block such a change because, under Section 123 of the Colonial 
Boundaries Act (passed by the British Parliament in 1895, but binding the 
Commonwealth from 1901), the Commonwealth Parliament may alter 
the boundary of a state only with the consent of the parliament of that 
state and the approval, by referendum, of the majority of the electors 
5  Quoted in Griffin, The Torres Strait, xxii; and see Griffin, ‘Impasse’.
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of that state. The Premier of Queensland, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, told 
Canberra that he would not give a portion of his state to another country. 
Queensland’s conservative government was confident that Queenslanders 
would support standing up to ‘Canberra’. Over the next five years, the 
government of Queensland presented itself to the public (and especially 
to the Torres Strait Islanders) as if it should be a third party to a border 
negotiation that was, strictly speaking, a matter for Australia and Papua 
New Guinea only. The tactics of Queensland were always to claim to be 
the only legitimate representative of the Torres Strait Islanders.
The Torres Strait had long had structures of political representation 
enabled by colonial government – the closest that Australia’s domestic 
colonial administration has come to ‘indirect rule’.6 The policy of the 
London Missionary Society (from its arrival in the Strait in 1871) had 
included the formation of Indigenous enterprises from 1897. In 1899, 
‘without precedent anywhere in the Pacific’, the Government Resident 
John Douglas (on Thursday Island) had initiated elected councils to 
advise administrators on each island.7 Against the advice of Douglas, the 
Queensland Government in 1904 subjected the Islanders to the Aboriginals 
Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897; however, the 
councils continued. They were among a series of secular and religious 
institutions through which the Islanders participated actively in their 
own governance throughout the twentieth century. The Islanders staffed 
and, to a significant extent, managed the marine industries initiated by 
mission and government – the collection of trochus, trepang, pearls and 
pearl-shell. These industries were effectively subsidised by a continuing 
Indigenous economy of gardening and fishing, for the declaration of the 
islands as reserves left natural resources in Islander hands. In 1936, angered 
by officials’ control over their earnings, they demonstrated the strength 
of this Indigenous economy when they withdrew their labour from the 
commercial fishing fleet for four months. The Queensland Government 
response eventually included allowing each elected council authority over 
police and courts. A meeting of councillors in 1937 cancelled certain state 
by-laws, and the state government wrote these changes into the Torres 
Strait Islanders Act 1939, which differentiated the Islanders’ governance 
from the administration of Queensland Aboriginal people’s lives. Wartime 
6  Silverstein, Governing Natives has recently argued that reforms proposed in the Commonwealth’s 
administration of the Northern Territory in 1939 would have produced ‘indirect rule’ had they been 
implemented. 
7  Beckett, Torres Strait Islanders, 45.
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service further confirmed the Islanders’ sense of worth and entitlement. 
Over 700 Islanders served, most of them in the Torres Strait Light Infantry 
Battalion or the Torres Strait Pioneer Company (in contrast, there was 
no distinct ‘Aboriginal’ corps in the Second World War). From 1949, 
the state’s system of ‘indirect rule’ included recognising a trio of Strait 
representatives – those elected from the Western, Central and Eastern 
island reserves. Beckett has pointed out the continuity of representative 
personnel, each man’s community standing sustained by his job – boat 
captain, local official, store-manager. The Islanders were also proud of the 
persistence of the Strait’s two languages, Miriam and Mabuiag, and their 
fervent adherence to Christianity did not extinguish reverence for the 
ancestors of their pre-colonial cosmology. Their mainland contact with 
Aboriginal people told them that Islanders were a comparatively well-
treated colonised people. Most Islanders residing in the Strait were not 
restless for change, but anxious to continue the security that Queensland’s 
hegemony afforded.8 The Queensland premier was therefore building 
confidently on a long tradition of government-solicited Islander politics 
in his February 1973 tour of the island reserves, when he endorsed the 
formation of a ‘Border Action Committee’.
For the Whitlam Government to develop a border policy, it had either 
to accept what amounted to a Queensland/Islander veto on any change 
in the border’s position (a hopeless start to any conversation with the 
leaders of Papua New Guinea) or to open its own line of communication 
with the Torres Strait Islanders, so that its public negotiating position 
(when talks with Papua New Guinea began) would be safe from the Torres 
Strait Islanders’ denunciation. Once in power, Whitlam was advised to 
be less specific about where he would like the boundary. The Chair of 
the Council for Aboriginal Affairs (CAA), Dr H. C. Coombs, warned 
Whitlam in January 1973 that he must take seriously not only that the 
Islanders felt ‘genuine anxiety and concern’ about the possible border 
change, but also that they were evidently pleased that the Queensland 
Government was voicing their opposition to it. In the same memorandum, 
Coombs recommended that Whitlam set up a series of meetings between 
the CAA and the Islanders, between the Islanders’ representatives 
and members of Whitlam’s Cabinet (Whitlam, Bill Morrison, Foreign 
Minister, and Gordon Bryant, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs), and 
between representatives of Papua New Guinea and the Islanders. 
8  Fisk and Tait, ‘Rights’.
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Perhaps, from such meetings, the Islanders would assent to the border 
change in exchange for security of land tenure, joint citizenship and the 
continuation of Australia’s social service and other benefits. ‘It would be 
important that Islanders’ representatives see [the solutions resulting from 
these meetings] as successes won by their personal efforts. They would 
then be more likely to advocate them among their own people.’9 In a joint 
statement with Michael Somare (Chief Minister of Papua New Guinea) 
on 17 January 1973, Whitlam declared that Australia was willing to 
negotiate the relocation of the border with Papua New Guinea, and that 
the Queensland Government and the Islanders would be consulted.
What could the Whitlam Government offer Torres Strait Islanders that 
they were not already getting from Queensland’s patronage? The national 
government, at that time, had little first-hand knowledge of a people that 
had long been administered exclusively by the Queensland Government. 
The 1971 Australian Census had counted 9,664 people of Torres Strait 
Islander descent. Of the 3,926 living on the islands of the Strait, 2,348 
were residents of reserves administered by the Queensland Government. 
If we add the residents of Bamaga Reserve, on the tip of Cape York, we 
can say that there were 2,932 Islanders living under the Queensland 
Government’s direct supervision in 1971. More than half (59 per cent) 
of those identifying as Torres Strait Islanders in 1971 did not live on the 
islands of the Strait but on the mainland: 37 per cent in Queensland, the 
other 22 per cent in the other states and territories of Australia. Islanders 
were numerous on the mainland because they were confident that they 
could improve their lot by selling their labour in the wider Australian 
economy. This diaspora maintained a sense of connection with the land, 
seas and people of the Strait, despite long absences, but they were not the 
subjects of Queensland Government patronage, and indeed some had left 
the reserves because they had fallen foul of the Queensland Government 
and of Torres Strait Islanders to whom the state had delegated a degree of 
power. Was their estrangement from the reserves an opportunity for the 
Whitlam Government to (in Coombs’s words to Bryant) ‘break the nexus 
between the Torres Strait Islanders and the Queensland government’? 10 
Could transactions between the Commonwealth and the Islanders form 
a new public version of the Islanders ‘interest’, removing a domestic 
political obstacle to negotiating a new border? 
9  Coombs to Whitlam, 10 January 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 360–61.
10  Coombs to Whitlam, 16 March 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 363.
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The Whitlam Government did not tackle this question in a unified way in 
1973; the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Gordon Bryant, competed with 
the CAA in finding a way to talk to the Islanders. Since 1970, the Office 
of Aboriginal Affairs (OAA), the executive arm of the CAA, had been 
reaching out to the people of the Strait in an exploration of possible paths 
of regional economic development. The OAA had funded a zoologist 
from The Australian National University (ANU), Dr Robert Bustard, 
to experiment in the farming of turtles in the Strait. When Bustard left 
ANU in 1971, the OAA recommended further funding for his project – 
now known as Applied Ecology. Bustard was necessarily in continuous 
dialogue with turtle-farming Islanders about how they saw their future. 
The CAA was also briefed by Jeremy Beckett, an anthropologist who had 
started to visit the Strait in 1958, leading to his 1964 PhD thesis and 
to ongoing visits. Initiating their own contact in Cairns on 14 February 
1973, the CAA (Coombs, Barrie Dexter and William Stanner) met with 
Tanu Nona, Getano Lui (Snr) and George Mye (who currently represented 
the Western, Central and Eastern island reserves), confirming that the 
Islanders wished to send a delegation to Canberra.
Bryant did not want the CAA to be the only source of his government’s 
knowledge of Strait politics; he sought to establish his own ‘task force’ 
for consultations, but this was quickly vetoed by Whitlam, acting on 
Coombs’s advice.11 Bryant sent a staff member to the Strait in March 1973 
to prepare the Islanders for a visit from Bryant himself in April. Believing 
the council chairmen to be too beholden to the state government, Bryant 
and his staff paid a lot of attention to Islanders not living on the reserves 
(i.e. to politically articulate Islanders on Thursday Island). These two visits 
made the councillors on the reserves uneasy; their coolness towards Bryant 
confirmed his assessment of them as no more than ‘favoured sons of the 
Queensland government’, unlike the progressive Islanders he had been 
able to speak to on Thursday Island.12 Bryant’s visit placed Barrie Dexter, 
Secretary of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, in an awkward position. 
Formally responsible for carrying out his minister’s plans, Dexter had 
become convinced that they were ill-conceived. The cardinal rule guiding 
Commonwealth diplomacy in the Strait must be to avoid offending 
the men who were powerful in the reserve councils and who were, for the 
moment, supporting the Border Action Committee; Bryant’s overtures 
11  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 364.
12  Bryant to Whitlam, 29 May 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 293–94.
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had broken that rule. This tension within the Whitlam Government’s 
early diplomacy towards the Islanders reflected not only wider tensions 
between Bryant’s and the CAA’s approach to ‘Aboriginal affairs’, they also 
were rooted in the differentiating impact of Queensland’s years of indirect 
rule. Some Islanders had flourished under Queensland reserve supervision 
and others had found it better to escape the reserves (to Thursday Island 
or the mainland). Those who had left were apt to be regarded as exiles 
by those who stayed, their claims to political participation sometimes 
contested by the reserve chairmen and by Queensland’s officials.
Between February and June 1973, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
was arranging to bring Islander representatives to Canberra for a face-
to-face meeting with Prime Minister Whitlam, and the department 
felt it had no choice but to respect the wishes of the Island Advisory 
Council chairmen about who could speak for the Torres Strait Islanders. 
Bryant sought to include an additional 12 Islanders whom he judged 
less compliant with Queensland Government wishes. When the official 
delegation of 42 gathered in Canberra on 12 and 13 June, it voted to 
exclude Bryant’s 12. This and other missteps by Bryant led to Whitlam 
replacing him with James Cavanagh on 9 October 1973. Cavanagh 
trusted the CAA’s approach to giving Islanders voice to Canberra, and so 
his appointment confirmed that the Torres Strait Islanders to whom the 
Whitlam Government would listen were those established leaders with 
whom both the Queensland Government and (increasingly) the CAA 
felt comfortable.
The Torres Strait Islands as a 
Commonwealth territory?
Before describing what the Whitlam Government learned from its June 
1973 meeting with Torres Strait Islanders, we should note the wider 
context of the Australian Government’s Strait diplomacy: the Whitlam 
Government’s aspiration to end the Queensland Government’s control 
over Aboriginal and Islander lives.
To ‘break the nexus between the Torres Strait Islanders and the Queensland 
government’, as the CAA advised Whitlam on 16 March (and substantially 
repeated to Bryant on 11 April 1973), the Australian Government should 
legislate Commonwealth control over all reserves in all states, and then 
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give Aboriginal residents title ‘in accordance with traditional native 
law and practice’.13 The government could then establish the Torres 
Strait reserve islands as a separate Commonwealth territory, governed 
by a council representing the former island reserves. To legitimise such 
an intervention, the government should conduct a referendum among 
Islanders ‘to ratify (a) the relocation of the border, (b) the establishment of 
the Commonwealth Torres Strait Territory, (c) the legislation to confirm 
traditional land tenure, [and] (d) the measure to protect Islanders’ fishing 
rights within the Torres Strait area’.14 This would remove the Queensland 
Government from the politics of negotiating a new boundary with Papua 
New Guinea and give Australia an explicit Islander mandate to negotiate 
a border change with Papua New Guinea. In such negotiations with Papua 
New Guinea, the CAA further advised, Australia should seek agreement 
that Australia would continue to be sovereign over the islands, rocks and 
reefs to the north of the new boundary. Repeating this advice to Bryant 
on 11 April 1973, the CAA gained Bryant’s support.15
Barrie Dexter later acknowledged that one of the CAA’s greatest political 
failures was not persuading the Whitlam or Fraser governments to take 
over Queensland’s reserves.16 Although Whitlam and Bryant announced 
in September 1973 that they would do so, and that they would fight 
Queensland in the High Court if necessary, Whitlam referred the policy 
to an interdepartmental committee that took until April 1975 to make 
a submission to Cabinet. Cabinet sent the idea back to this committee for 
reconsideration of the policy’s administrative complexities and financial 
costs. By the time the Whitlam Government fell on 11 November 1975, 
Cabinet had still not agreed to a workable course of action.
There is no doubt that some Torres Strait Islanders supported the idea of 
making the Torres Strait a territory of the Commonwealth. At a Townsville 
seminar to discuss the border issue, held under the joint auspices of the 
Townsville College of Advanced Education and the North Queensland 
branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs on 29–31 
October 1976, Murray Island–born Eddie Mabo endorsed the proposal 
as a step towards Torres Strait Islanders’ autonomy – first within Australia 
and then (possibly) outside Australia:
13  Coombs to Whitlam, 16 March 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 363.
14  Coombs to Whitlam, 16 March 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 363.
15  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 356.
16  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 477.
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We are a people of unique identity and we should work towards 
an ultimate goal of independence. We want to be recognised 
separately from our Papuan brothers and from our Australian 
brothers. We are the Islanders … I would like to suggest that the 
Federal Government take over all the Torres Strait region from 
Queensland and then negotiate with the Islanders themselves to 
vest their administration in their own hands. The area could then 
be declared an autonomous region within the Commonwealth of 
Australia with its own sovereign rights and the right to secede.17 
Australian Government caution about taking over all Aboriginal and 
Islander reserves in Queensland meant that a referendum was never held 
to test Islander support for making the Torres Strait a Commonwealth 
territory. More pertinent to this chapter is that the idea of such a territory 
quickly became irrelevant to solving the specific political problem of 
securing an Islander mandate for border negotiation, because another 
solution emerged from the June 1973 meeting between the Australian 
Government and the Islander delegation.
Towards the protected zone
In the June 1973 meeting, Islanders rejected a border change, asserting that 
‘everything that is contained within the [current] border – land and waters 
– are ours by tradition’.18 According to the CAA’s notes, they rejected as 
misconception that, historically and culturally, they were linked with the 
Papuans. They did not acknowledge Papuan fishing rights in the Strait, 
though they admitted to tolerating Papuans fishing at Warrior Reef. They 
spoke proudly of establishing their supremacy over Papuans in nineteenth-
century battles. The representatives were unanimous also in rejecting oil 
drilling in the Strait: ‘any spills would destroy everything that means 
life for our people’.19 When questioned on the possibility of petroleum 
royalties, they insisted that they were interested in survival, not in wealth. 
They said that they wanted their Australian citizenship to continue, and 
they wished Australia to retain the uninhabited islands close to the Papuan 
coast, seeing them as belonging to residents of islands  nearby.20 When 
17  Mabo, ‘Perspectives’, 35. Emphasis in original.
18  George Mye cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 367.
19  Mye cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 367.
20  The DAA notes on this meeting are included in H. C. Coombs’s Minutes to Whitlam, H. C. 
Coombs Papers, National Library of Australia (NLA) MS 802, Box 46, between Minutes 135/73 and 
136/73.
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Whitlam joined this meeting (welcomed by the Islanders’ hymns), he 
made it clear that he wanted them to consider a border change. He cited 
United Nations’ interest in the border issue since 1971, and foreshadowed 
that Papua New Guinea would get self-government on 1 December 1973 
and full independence 12 or 15 months after that.
Assessing these discussions for Whitlam, Coombs summarised what he 
understood to be the Islanders’ position:
1. the land and sea is all one region owned by them; 2. they are 
ethnically distinct from Papuans; 3. they opposed any oil or 
mineral development of the seabed, at any price; 4. they feared 
PNG control over the seas, as Japanese interests would be given 
permission to fish; 5. they did not like the proposal to move the 
border, and nor did their Papuan friends see any point in 
the change.21
The meeting made it possible for the Australian Government to discern 
differences among the Islanders’ hopes and fears. Not only were they 
fearful that parts of the Strait would be ceded to Papua New Guinea 
(a point already being made effectively by the Queensland premier), but 
they were worried that their seas would be despoiled by oil drilling (which 
the Queensland Government was more likely to permit). The prime 
minister told the Islander representatives in June that Queensland, not 
the Commonwealth, had been promoting off-shore oil drilling in the 
Strait.22 Thus was revealed a point of leverage for the Commonwealth: 
perhaps the Commonwealth could distinguish itself as the Islanders’ 
better champion by linking the change in the border with a promise of 
environmental protection?
At the June meeting in Canberra, Whitlam persuaded the Islanders to 
meet with Papuans from the coastal villages and discuss border change. 
They did so on Yam Island on 19 and 20 September 1973. Getano Lui 
(Snr) said of this discussion:
We told the Papuan people we did not want our border changed. 
They said they did not ask for it to be changed either. The Papuan 
people asked about fishing – they wanted to know if they could go 
on fishing in the Torres Strait. We said we were happy to share the 
21  Coombs to Whitlam, 12 June 1973, Minute 127/73, NLA MS 802, Box 46.
22  The 28-page transcript of the 12–14 June meeting of the Torres Strait Islander delegation in 
Canberra is in NLA MS 802, Box 11, folder 81.
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fishing. Both peoples said they were worried about the damage to 
our fishing grounds and islands if there was oil drilling or mining 
and we decided to ask for protection against this. Out of the 
conference there came an agreement between us – and we are the 
people directly involved.23
Coombs, who also attended the meeting, was quick to convey its 
resolutions to Whitlam:24
That the waterways between the Torres Strait and the coastal area 
of the western district of Papua New Guinea be reserved wholly 
and solely for the use of our two peoples, namely the coastal people 
of the villages of the western district of Papua New Guinea and the 
Islander inhabitants of the Torres Strait Islands as was tradition 
practised by our forebears; drilling for oil in such waters which 
could result in possible oil spillage and the consequent threat 
of pollution to the environment be banned; fishing by outside 
interests should also be banned.25 
In combination, the Canberra and Yam Island meetings gave the CAA 
confidence that the border change proposal could be reformulated so 
that environmental protection would be its central feature, a regime 
acknowledging the customary fishing practices of both Torres Strait 
Islanders and coastal Papuans. Referring to the ‘unique and integrated 
environment on which the livelihood and the culture and traditions of 
the Islanders and the peoples of the South-western coast of Papua-New 
Guinea depend’, the earliest draft of this proposal (in October 1973, 
shortly after Cavanagh succeeded Bryant as minister) outlined possible 
government guarantees of residents’ free movement and fishing. The 
Islanders and Papuans would have the benefit of scientific scrutiny of 
future ‘economic projects’ before any were submitted for approval by the 
chairmen of the councils of the Torres Strait Islands and of the coastal 
communities of south-western Papua New Guinea. In this proposal, 
the licensing of marine harvesting would be restricted to locals and to 
companies in which locals had at least 85 per cent equity. The Torres 
Strait would be administered ‘as a National Park in accordance with 
internationally accepted practices for such Parks’. If the governments 
of Australia and Papua New Guinea could agree to administer jointly 
a marine park in the Strait, perhaps they would not need to plot a precise 
23  As reported in the Courier Mail, 10 May 1976, and cited by Griffin, ‘Impasse’, 230.
24  Coombs to Whitlam, 24 September 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 369.
25  Resolutions of the Yam Island meeting are cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 369.
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boundary between the two nations. Referring to permanent residents 
of the Torres Strait Islands and the south-western coast of Papua New 
Guinea, the draft recognised ‘traditional and customary practices of 
the local inhabitants with respect to the taking of fish and other living 
marine products’ and the right of ‘traditional and customary freedom of 
movement of local inhabitants’ including navigation.26 
Negotiations by the Fraser Government
Although in 1974 and 1975 the concept of a jointly administered 
protected zone without boundary found favour among some of the 
departments that were determining the Whitlam Government’s 
approach to negotiating with Papua New Guinea, the negotiations had 
not commenced by the time the Whitlam Government was sacked in 
November 1975. Champions of the Torres Strait Islander interest now 
had to pitch the protected zone model within an interdepartmental 
committee that would advise a government led by Malcolm Fraser. 
Their advocacy succeeded. On 26 February 1976, Cabinet (in Dexter’s 
summary) ‘endorsed the concept of a Protected Zone, preferably with no 
seabed boundary through it, and the concept of no prospecting or mining 
initially’.27 What remained in dispute, within the Fraser Government, was 
how closely the Australian Government should involve the Islanders in the 
consideration of its tactics once the negotiations started. As the Australian 
Government was anticipating pressure from Papua New Guinea to 
concede a hard border bisecting the Strait, it had to consider at what point 
to make tactical concessions to Papua New Guinea’s expectations. Unless 
there were close communications between Canberra and the Islander 
leaders, it was possible for the Queensland Government, not party to the 
border negotiation, to embarrass the Australian Government by telling 
the Islanders that Canberra was about to sell them out by allowing a new 
line to be drawn through the Strait.28 
26  In this paragraph I draw on two documents drafted by Coombs: ‘Drafting notes on Torres Strait 
Border’, 8 October 1973, NLA MS 802, Box 11, folder 81; and ‘Draft Agreement’, 29 October 1973, 
NLA MS 802, Box 12, folder 88.
27  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 451.
28  Dexter gives a detailed account of the battles within the Australian Government in Pandora’s Box, 
450–60.
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Islander leaders such as Getano Lui (Snr) were quick to warn the Fraser 
Government that, were the negotiators to concede such a new border, 
the Islanders would complain to the International Court and the United 
Nations; the Queensland Government said it would support them.29 
Within the Australian Government, some officials were more willing than 
others to take this risk; they saw justice in Papua New Guinea’s wish for 
a hard border bisecting the Strait, and they thought that there was a good 
chance that international adjudicators would agree. In this perspective, 
Australia’s tactics should be to signal early in the negotiations that it was 
sympathetic to pressure from Papua New Guinea to draw a hard median 
border. In April 1976, Commonwealth departments (Aboriginal Affairs 
and Attorney-General’s) that continued to present the Torres Strait Islander 
interest in a borderless protected zone found themselves standing between 
Australian officials preparing to concede a new border and those, outside 
the negotiations, opposed to this concession. Trying to persuade the Torres 
Strait Islanders not to turn back to the Queensland Government as their 
champion, the departments of Aboriginal Affairs and Attorney-General’s 
struggled against the Department of Foreign Affairs, seeking to maintain the 
Torres Strait Islander perspective within the Australian negotiating position.
In the ensuing negotiations, a compromise position emerged. A seabed 
resources line bisecting the Strait gave Papua New Guinea something 
of what it wanted, partly satisfying those who had thought it equitable 
between nation-states that the people and resources of the Strait be 
bisected, and partly satisfying those who wanted Australian sovereignty 
to continue over all the lands and seas that the Torres Strait Islanders 
understood to be their customary territory. The seabed resources boundary 
was a line of potential, not immediate, significance because the protected 
zone disallowed mining and drilling of the seabed for 10 years after the 
treaty’s commencement (and this embargo has since been extended).
Concluding reflections
This story would have made an apt case for the kind of history of 
decolonisation practised by Tracey Banivanua-Mar – a perspective on 
decolonisation made possible, she once wrote, by ‘the angle of vision 
offered from the Pacific’.30 That is, instead of supposing that the only 
29  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 452.
30  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 8.
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significant territorial results of decolonisation have been clearly bounded 
independent nation-states, historians of decolonisation should look for 
evidence of what the colonised peoples wanted and considered themselves 
entitled to have. If we ‘refocus on people rather than territory, as agents 
of decolonisation’, then we may notice Pacific Indigenous ‘formations 
of decolonisation’ that have ‘exceeded the nation’. Banivanua-Mar’s 
framework sensitises the historian to Pacific peoples’ aspirations to devise 
political structures that correspond with their own evolving sense of who 
the Pacific’s peoples are and how they want to relate to each other; such 
a history would note the distinctions that such peoples would make 
among themselves and the relationships that they wish to sustain. Such 
histories ‘may learn of the innovative means by which independence and 
self-determination were practised in the absence of it being gifted by 
administering states’.31 
I have puzzled over why Banivanua-Mar did not see the possible richness 
of the Torres Strait case for her 2016 book; perhaps she would have 
tackled it had her productive life not ended so early. But her professed 
interest in what she calls ‘stateless forms of decolonisation’ may be a clue 
to the absence of the Torres Strait border story from her work.32 For Torres 
Strait Islander agency in the period 1973–78 was hardly ‘stateless’. On the 
contrary, the historical conditions of their awkward force (awkward from 
the point of view of the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea) 
included the fact that Australia is a federation with a long heritage of 
states (Queensland, at least) jealously preserving their patronage over their 
Indigenous people. Torres Strait Islander intransigence was amplified by 
Queensland’s insistence on its rights as a state. It is partly an effect of the 
politics of Australian federalism that two nation-states had to consider 
what Banivanua-Mar calls the ‘primarily transnational lateral connections 
and networks throughout the peripheries’ – in this case, the customary 
relationships between the Torres Strait Islanders and their nearest 
Papuan neighbours.33 
The Torres Strait Islanders, in the story that I have told, were 
simultaneously Queenslanders, Australians and familiar neighbours of 
coastal Papuan villagers. As Queenslanders they had long experience 
of  indirect rule. As  Australians they had recently become fully eligible 
31  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 8.
32  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 20.
33  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 9.
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for welfare payments that were generous by the standards of their region. 
As sea-going peoples of the Strait, they saw value in state protection of 
shared marine resources. In 1973 they began to announce themselves as 
critics of a particular instance of what Banivanua-Mar calls the ‘imperial’ 
assumption that decolonisation is a two-party transaction – in this case, 
between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Such an ‘imperial’ view of 
the border issue persists in Donald Denoon’s 2009 remark: ‘a deal could 
perhaps have been struck much sooner, if not for the Islanders stubborn 
resistance.’34 His words express both ‘imperial’ frustration that a two-
sided transaction became devilishly three-sided and admiration for Torres 
Strait Islander gumption. 
The resulting Torres Strait Treaty hopefully expresses a community of 
interest among those living partly on the marine resources of the Torres 
Strait. Olewale represented this community of interest as ‘Papuan’, but 
in the September 1973 Yam Island meeting it was possible to represent 
the people of the Strait without such singular ethnicity. Before that 
meeting, when briefing Canberra in June 1973, Torres Strait Islanders 
had clearly stated their longstanding sense of distinction from, and even 
superiority over, the coastal Papuans who also used parts of the Strait’s 
fisheries. Political circumstances generated a search for common interests. 
The resulting protected zone is not only an agreed jurisdictional overlap 
between two nation-states, but also the continuing commons of these 
sea-going peoples. With the emergence of Papua New Guinea from 
Australia’s mandate, and with the currency of the idea that equitable 
dealing required Australia to cede seas and islands to the new nation, it 
became politically necessary for the Papuans and the Torres Strait Islanders 
to state joint opposition to nation-state partitioning and economic 
development of a  region of their customary mingling. The Papua New 
Guinea independence process and the politics of Australian federalism 
were the contexts in which the Strait’s ‘primarily transnational lateral 
connections and networks throughout the peripheries’ could be 
simultaneously Papuan and Torres Strait Islander.35
34  Denoon, The Hundred, 12. 
35  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 9.
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